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1 Introduction
Why are some rms persistently more productive than others? Evidence reveals
substantial and persistent di¤erences in productivity between plants or between rms
[e.g., Baily et al. (1992)]. The same evidence can be found in several countries [e.g.
Fox and Smeets (2010), Fukao and Kwon (2006)]. This indicates that the persistent
di¤erences in productivity are universal. Taking the persistent heterogeneity be-
tween rms as given, researchers investigate how the reallocation of resources across
heterogeneous rms inuences the aggregate economy [e.g., Melitz (2003) and Lentz
and Mortensen (2008)]. However, the reasons for the productivity di¤erences remain
an open question and an unobserved rm-specic xed e¤ect explains large portions
of the productivity di¤erences [e.g., Fox and Smeets (2010)].
Apparently, productivity is not the only variable that exhibits persistent di¤er-
ences. Evidence also shows that skill compositions and wage payments exhibit persis-
tent di¤erences between rms [e.g., Haltiwanger et al. (2007)]. Moreover, persistent
di¤erences in prots are pervasive [e.g., McGahan (1999)]. The coexistence of per-
sistent di¤erences in these variables is not coincidental. Productive rms employ
skilled workers and pay high wages [e.g., Haltiwanger et al. (1999)]. In addition,
skills and the market value of a rm are positively correlated [Abowd et al. (2004)].
Evidence implies that the persistence of di¤erences in productivity, skills, wages, and
prots may have the same source.
As suggested by Haltiwanger et al. (2007), the assignment model provides a
potential explanation for the coexistence of persistent di¤erences in several variables.
If a quasi-xed rm-specic resource and workersskills are complementary to each
other, a rm endowed with large resources is willing to pay high wages to attract
skilled workers. Such a rm achieves high productivity and earns large prots.
However, this seemingly plausible explanation does not provide a complete answer.
First, why do some rms succeed in investing and maintaining their specic resources
while others do not? Evidence shows that the pace of job creation and job destruction
is quite rapid and that idiosyncratic factors are the main source of the observed gross
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job ows in the US economy [e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)]. This indicates
that rms always confront idiosyncratic changes that may destroy some rm-specic
resources. What is the mechanism that enables productive rms to maintain their
core resources and prevents unproductive rms from investing these resources in a
changing environment?
Second, can the assignment model provide a reasonable explanation even if we
cannot observe rm-specic resources? Evidence shows that unobserved heterogene-
ity explains a large part of the variations in productivity [e.g., Bartelsman and Doms
(2000)]. This indicates that intangible assets are likely to be the main component of
rm-specic resources. Because intangible assets are, by denition, di¢ cult to esti-
mate, an assignment model based on intangible assets must rely on perceived values.
How do speculative beliefs inuence the persistence of variables? More importantly,
to what extent is the observed persistence inuenced by the discrepancy between
beliefs and fundamental values? Because researchers disagree about the productive
importance of intangible assets [e.g., Bond and Cummins (2000) and Hall (2001)],
this question is important for understanding persistent inequalities in the era of the
knowledge economy.
To answer these questions and explain the observed persistent productivity dif-
ferences between rms, we propose a dynamic assignment model for the relationship
between the skills of workers and unobserved rm-specic knowledge, which we term
a rms organization capital.1 There are three key assumptions in our model. 1)
Skills and organization capital are complementary inputs. 2) Skills are an input in
the accumulation of organization capital. 3) Although we cannot directly observe the
amount of rm-specic knowledge, we can infer it from the rms productivity. These
assumptions allow us to analyze how not only the assignment mechanism, but also
the discrepancy between beliefs and fundamental values inuences the persistence of
1More specically, we dene organization capital as all types of intangible assets embodied in an
organization. It might consist of the organizational structure, daily practices, routines, information
held by an organization, corporate culture, reputation, and so on.
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observed productivity.
The main logic can be explained as follows. If a rms organization capital is
believed to be high, this belief attracts skilled workers. On the other hand, because
skill is an input in the accumulation of organization capital, the employment of skilled
workers promotes the accumulation of organization capital. A rm that accumulates
more organization capital can be expected to improve its performance, which conrms
the perception that the rm has a higher level of organization capital.
We derive the dynamics of relative productivity, where relative productivity is
measured by the logarithm of the total factor productivity (TFP) relative to industry
and year averages. When assignment between beliefs and skills exists, the dynamics
of relative productivity is shown to exhibit a reversion to a rm-specic xed e¤ect
plus the expected relative productivity. As long as the adjustment of the expectation
is very slow, the expected relative productivity is not empirically distinguishable from
the unobserved xed e¤ect in the standard productivity dynamics regressions. In
fact, when productivity has no predictive power for organization capital, nobody can
update their beliefs. Therefore, the expected relative productivity never changes.
That is, it is shown that a xed e¤ect can be derived without any real heterogeneity
across rms.
In order to quantify the persistence of relative productivity, we measure it by
the correlation between current relative productivity and its lagged values. This
measure can be decomposed into two parts: the share of the variance of the long-
run average relative productivity in the variance of the relative productivity (the
between-to-overall variance ratio), which measures the permanent persistence, and
the correlation between the current deviation of the relative productivity from its
long-run average and its lagged values (within-correlation), which measures the tem-
poral persistence. The diversity of productivity can be measured by the variance
of the relative productivity that is the sum of the variance of the long-run average
relative productivity (between-variance) and the variance of the deviation of the rel-
ative productivity from its long-run average (within-variance). We derive analytical
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predictions on each component. Examining these predictions, we analytically and
quantitatively analyze the reason behind the persistence and diversity of productivity
di¤erences.
Three analytical results are worthy of special attention. First, it is shown that the
within-correlation (i.e., the measure of the temporal persistence) is strongly inuenced
by the correlation between the current expected deviation of relative productivity
from its long-run average and its lagged values (the measure for the persistence of
the expected deviation, hereafter). Theory suggests that the assignment between the
beliefs regarding organization capital and skills induces the persistence of the beliefs
that anchor the dynamics of relative productivity. The measure for the persistence
of the expected deviation captures the persistence of the beliefs through the proposed
feedback mechanism.
Second, we identify three main factors that can inuence the persistence of the
expected deviation  the variation of skills, the di¢ culty in inferring organization
capital, and the variation of a rm-specic xed e¤ect. When the variance of skills
is high, the top organization has the greatest advantage because it can attract the
best workers, who can provide the rm with the best knowledge and promote the
accumulation of organization capital, which, in turn, helps maintain beliefs in high
organization capital. This e¤ect increases the persistence of the expected deviation.
We measure the importance of assignment by the variation of skills because if there
is no heterogeneity of skill, the assignment problem does not exist.
There are two other factors. As we discussed before, if it is di¢ cult to infer orga-
nization capital, people cannot change their beliefs. Because the assignment occurs
between the beliefs and skills, peoples beliefs can be conrmed by the assignment
of skilled workers who correspond to their beliefs. Therefore, the expected devia-
tion of relative productivity is more persistent. More interestingly, an increase in
rm-specic heterogeneity lowers the persistence of the expected deviation. If a top
organization already has a big advantage, the benets from assigned skilled workers
can be small relative to what it has already. Hence, the temporal deviation from the
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long-run average is expected to be short. Therefore, the persistence of the expected
deviation is small.
Third, among the three factors that we identify, we nd that only an increase in
skill variation can unambiguously raise the persistence and diversity of productivity.
In other words, an increase in rm-specic heterogeneity may lower the persistence
and diversity of productivity. A rise in skill variation increases not only the per-
sistence of the beliefs, but also the impacts of the beliefs on productivity because
it makes it possible for a rm believed to have high organization capital to attract
more highly skilled workers. Both mechanisms amplify small rm heterogeneity and
increase the persistence and diversity of productivity. On the other hand, because a
rise in rm-specic heterogeneity lowers the benets from assignment, the amplica-
tion e¤ect becomes smaller. Therefore, the persistence and diversity of productivity
might be reduced.
We use the theory to quantify the importance of three factors as a source of the
persistence and diversity of productivity. For this purpose, we calibrate parameters
so that the derived dynamics and the disparity of relative productivity is consistent
with observed dynamics and the diversity of productivities, using rm-level data from
Japan (the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities [BSJBSA])
between 1994 to 2004.
The calibrated parameters reveal that the implied variations of a rm-specic
xed e¤ect are very small. This means that the observed variations in productivity
di¤erences can be explained without having large variations on the rm side. Based
on the calibrated parameters, we simulate our analytical correlation. It is shown
that the model can quantitatively capture changes in the correlation of the relative
productivity over time.
We conduct several counterfactual experiments. They show that if there was
no assignment problem, the correlation of relative productivity diminishes to less
than 10 percent after two years and the variance of relative productivity drops by 79
percent. On the contrary, even if there is no variations in the rm-specic factors, the
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correlation remains about 34 percent after 10 years and the variance drops only by
15 percent. Finally, noisy information has only a minor inuence on the correlation
and variance of relative productivity.
This result is less likely to be specic to Japan. It is also shown that similar
results can be conrmed by the analysis of labor productivity using an industry annual
dataset in COMPUSTAT covering 1970 to 2004. In sum, the quantitative exercises
repeatedly suggest that the assignment mechanism that causes the sluggish movement
of beliefs and a rise in the sensitivity of productivity to the beliefs has quantitatively
large impacts on the observed persistence and disparity of productivity; rm-specic
heterogeneity and noisy information have only modest impacts.
It has long been recognized that an individual rm possesses rm-specic knowl-
edge. Prescott and Visscher (1980) refer to this accumulated specic knowledge as a
rms organization capital. Recently, interest in organization capital has reemerged.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), and Samaniego (2006)
quantied the macroeconomic e¤ects of organization capital. However, no paper
has addressed the question of why some rms succeed in accumulating organization
capital, whereas others do not. This is the main aim of this paper.
Unlike previous researchers, we model organization capital as a form of vintage
human capital. For any organization, ancestors determine a particular routine,
culture, and organizational structure that successors inherit and modify. Hence, the
workers employed in the past inuence the organizations future. This modeling
strategy allows us to investigate how the assignment of workers to organizations have
long-run e¤ects on organization capital.
Positive assortative assignment models also have a long history [e.g., Becker (1973)
and Sattinger (1979)]. Kremer (1993) demonstrated that the model of positive
assortative matching among workers can explain a variety of evidence. Our model
conveys the spirit of Kremers (1993) idea in a dynamic framework; that is, current
skilled workers attract skilled successors.
Most assignment models are static and the distribution of assigned variables is
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treated as given. Notable exceptions are Acemoglu (1997) and Jovanovic (1998).
Both authors examine persistent income inequality. Unlike them, we endogenize the
distribution of organization capital and examine persistent di¤erences in productivity.
Learning is another important feature of the model. As Jovanovic (1982) ex-
plained, a rm gradually learns its own productive capacity. However, unlike Jo-
vanovic (1982), we assume that a rms productive capacity itself changes because of
investment in organization capital and idiosyncratic shocks that change the useful-
ness of the accumulated knowledge. Hence, even mature rms must continue to learn
about their capability. We suggest that this modeling strategy mimics the nature of
rmsbehavior in a changing and uncertain environment.
Although estimating organization capital is di¢ cult, the key assumptions made
in this paper are broadly consistent with the evidence. First, evidence shows that
a productive organizational arrangement demands skill [e.g., Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) and Bresnahan et al. (2002)]. This is consistent with our assumption of com-
plementarity between organization capital and skill2. Second, the evidence is also
consistent with the assumption that skill is important for the accumulation of orga-
nization capital. Evidence from Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) suggests that rms
need the intangible assets accumulated by skilled workers to make organizational
changes productive. In addition, evidence shows that the intangible assets accumu-
lated by skilled workers are an important determinant of technology adoption [e.g.,
Doms et al. (1997)]. Hence, the evidence consistently indicates that organization
2Recently, researchers have tried to nd more direct evidence using matched employeremployee
data. Although controversial evidence has been found by some researchers (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis 1999), other researchers have criticized the identication strategy used by these authors
(e.g., Bagger and Lentz (2007), Eeckhout and Kircher (2009)) and developed alternative methods
to examine empirically the positive assortative matching hypothesis in a labor market. Among
them, Mendes, Van den Berg, and Lindeboom (2007) and Lopes de Melo (2008) provided evidence
based on their methods that supports a positive assortative matching hypothesis. At least, there is
no evidence against a positive assortative matching hypothesis if observable characteristics are not
controlled for, which is more relevant in this paper.
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capital, as modeled in this paper, plays an important role in improving productivity
by stimulating technological and organizational changes.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain an intuition
regarding how persistent productivity di¤erences occur. In Section 3, we set up a
dynamic positive assortative matching model between unobserved organization cap-
ital and skill. The existence and stability of a stationary distribution is proved.
In Section 4, we derive the dynamics of relative productivity and provide analytical
predictions. In Section 5, we calibrate parameters and conduct several quantitative
exercises, which produce the quantitative predictions of the model. In Section 6,
we summarize the results and conclude by providing three implications for empirical
research on productivity dynamics.
2 Intuitive explanation for the mechanism of the
persistent productivity di¤erence
The persistent di¤erence in productivity can be derived without any uncertainty.
Hence, it is instructive to start with the assumption of perfectly observable organi-
zation capital. In the next section, we extend the model to unobserved organization
capital in order to emphasize the role of beliefs .
The economy is represented by a continuum of workers and rms. The population
of both rms and workers is normalized to unity. Each rm has organization capital
of kot , and there is a set of rms, the total mass of which is also normalized to unity.
Suppose that ln kot is normally distributed with a mean of ot and a standard deviation
of ot at the date t. Assume also that ln qt is normally distributed with a mean of
q and a standard deviation of q at any date. For simplicity, we assume that rms
and workers have reservation values of 0. Because the number of rms is the same as
the number of workers, nobody chooses the outside option and every agent can nd
a partner. Hence, these assumptions make it possible to focus on the assignment
problem.
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We focus on the positive assortative matching equilibrium. This means that
the top x percent of ln kot is assigned to the top x percent of ln qt for any x. Let
 () denote the standard normal distribution. Given that ln kot ot
ot
and
ln qt q
q
are
distributed as standard normal variables, a positive assortative matching equilibrium
implies that:
1  

ln kot   ot
ot

= 1  

~ (ln kot )  q
q

; 8 ln kot : (1)
where ~ () is a rms optimal policy function, which maps the space of organization
capital to the space of quality of workers. We will explicitly describe the rms
optimization decision in the next section, but whatever the rms decision problem
is, equation (1) states that the policy function must satisfy:
~ (ln kot ) =
q
ot
[ln kot   ot] + q; 8 ln kot :
Note that a one percent increase in ln kot makes the rm employ
q
ot
percent more tal-
ented workers. That is, because of assignment, the benets from having an additional
large ln kot depends on the variation of skill relative to the variation of organization
capital, q
ot
.
The dynamics of organization capital is described by the following equation:
kot+1 = B (k
o
t )
 (qt)
 e"t ; 0   < 1;  > 0; (2)
where B,  and  are constant parameters and "t is a random variable, which is
normally distributed with a mean of  2"
2
and a standard deviation of ". The
parameter measures the technological persistence of organization capital. Although
some organization capital depreciates, we assume that a fraction, , of ln kot can be
carried over to the next period.
Because ln qt =  (ln kot ) =
q
ot
(ln kot   ot) + q, in equilibrium, the dynamics of
organization capital can be written as:
ln kot+1 = lnB +  ln k
o
t + 

q
ot
(ln kot   ot) + q

+ "t: (3)
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Because ln kot and "t are normally distributed, ln k
o
t+1 is also normally distributed.
Hence, the dynamics of ot and ot can be derived from equation (3) as follows:
ot+1 = lnB + ot + q  
2"
2
; ot+1 =
q
2t
2
ot + 
2
";
where t = +
q
ot
. These two equations characterize the dynamics of the aggregate
state variables. By using the dynamics of ot, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
ln kot+1   ot+1 = t (ln kot   ot) + "t ;
where "t = "t+
2"
2
is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of ". This equation implies that when ln kot is larger than its industry mean, ot,
the fraction t of this relative advantage is carried over to the next period. Because
persistence is only inuenced by t, we refer to this as the persistence parameter
in what follows. Note that the persistence parameter is composed of technological
persistence  and persistence due to the assignment mechanism, q
ot
. It shows that
the larger the assignment e¤ect is, the larger the persistence.
We can show that ot and ot globally converge to the stationary points, which
are denoted by o1 and o1. Then, the dynamics of organization capital are as
follows:
D ln kot+1 = 1D ln k
o
t + "

t ; (4)
where D ln kot = ln k
o
t   o1, 1 =  + qo1 and o1q =
+
r
1+(1 2)

"
q
2
1 2 . Note
that o1 is not 0. Because q is always positive, when ot is small, the assignment
e¤ect, q
ot
; is large. Hence, a rm with a relatively large organization capital benets
substantially. This mechanism increases ot. Ultimately, o1 does not converge to
0.
We can show that the persistence parameter, 1, is increasing in skill variation
relative to the standard deviation of random shocks, q
"
, which measures the impor-
tance of assignment.
1 2 (; 1) ; d1
dq
"
> 0; lim
q
"
!1
1 = 1: (5)
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As the persistence parameter is always less than 1, equation (4) is covariance station-
ary. Hence, the correlation between current organization capital and its lagged values,
which is equivalent to the autocorrelation of D ln kot in the stationary environment, is
entirely determined by the persistence parameter 1, oj 
E[D ln kotD ln kot j]
2o1
= j1.
Note that if there is no shock, q
"
= 1 and oj = 1 for any j. When there
are no idiosyncratic shocks, the top organization always attracts the best workers,
who, in turn, equip the rm with the best knowledge. Hence, the rm remains
at the top and maintains exactly the same level of organization capital in the long
run. When we introduce idiosyncratic shocks into the accumulation of organization
capital, q
"
<1, a reversion to the mean occurs. Idiosyncratic shocks make changes
in rankings possible. A rm that receives a positive shock climbs the rankings, which
enables it to attract higher quality workers. This means that top organizations cannot
remain the best and might slip down the rankings.
The next section incorporates uncertainty into the model and formally denes the
equilibrium.
3 The Model
In this section, we explicitly describe the rms optimization decision and dene the
equilibrium with unobserved organization capital. In addition, we add the time-
invariant component in organization capital and physical capital in the production
function. These factors are not necessary to describe the main logic of this paper.
However, as it is known that a xed e¤ect explains a large variation of the TFP
between rms, this is a requirement for a quantitative theory of the TFP dynamics.
We assume that a rm with the TFP At employs physical capital kt and a unit
mass of workers3 and produces output of yt according to the production function
yt = Atk

t , where  2 (0; 1). Because the total mass of workers is 1, we can alterna-
3A xed amount of labor is used for production. As Lentz and Mortensen (2008) shows, it is
known that there is almost no correlation between labor productivity and labor inputs. Hence, as
our main focus is the productivity dynamics, this is a convenient assumption for a simple analysis.
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tively interpret yt (kt) as the output per unit of workers (physical capital per unit of
workers).
Assume that At is a function of organization capital, kot , and the average quality
of workers, qt:
At = e
utkot q
 
t ; qt =
Z 1
0
qjtdj
 1

; (6)
where  > 0 and   1 are constant parameters and ut is a rm-specic productivity
shock, which is normally distributed with a mean of 2u
2
and a variance of 2u. We call
this shock, ut, noise because its only role is to make organization capital di¢ cult to
observe. The range of the parameter  allows that each worker can be complementary
to each other. This assumption captures Kremers (1993) idea of team production.
Assume that organization capital has two components, ln kot = ln k
of + ln kovt ,
where kof is a rm-specic xed component and kovt is a time-varying transitory
component. We assume that kof is known and perfectly observable, but that kovt
cannot be directly observed and must be inferred from the realizations of the TFPs.
When employment decisions are made, we assume that the TFP is not realized.
Hence, a decision must be based on a conditional expectation given the prior be-
liefs about the level of organization capital. We assume that the prior distribution
of ln kovt is normally distributed with a mean of 
v
ot and a variance of 
2
ot. Then,
the prior distribution of ln kot is normally distributed with a mean of ot = ln k
of +
vot and a variance of 
2
ot. Hence, the expected output is E [ytjot; ot; ln qt; kt] =
exp

ot +
2ot
2
+  ln qt +  ln kt

. Assume that a rm rents physical capital each pe-
riod at a rental price r. Then, it is easy to show thatmaxkt fE [ytjot; ot; ln qt; kt]  rktg =
(1  )E [ytjot; ot; ln qt], where:
E [ytjot; ot; ln qt] 


r
 
1 
exp
1
1  

ot +
2ot
2
+  ln qt

: (7)
As we implicitly assume that there is a risk-neutral representative household with a
constant discount rate, r is constant in the equilibrium. Hence, we take r as given.
Assume that a rm-specic xed component of organization capital, ln kof , is
normally distributed across rms with the mean  
2
f
2
and the variance 2f . We also
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assume the same transition equation (2) for the dynamics of the transitory component
of organization capital, ln kovt . Then, the dynamics of ln k
o
t would be:
ln kot+1 = lnB
 +  ln kot +  ln qt + F + "t; (8)
where F = (1  )

ln kof +
2f
2

is normally distributed with the mean 0 and the
variance 2F = (1  )2 2f and lnB = lnB (1  )
2f
2
. The parameter F represents
a rm-specic xed factor in this paper.
In order to characterize a rms problem, we need to describe how a rms current
choice inuences the beliefs regarding ln kot . After the rm employs a worker, output
is produced. From the realized output, the rm knows the TFP and, therefore,
e

ut+
2u
2

kot . Hence, a rm uses a signal, st  ln kot + ut , to infer ln kot , where
ut = ut +
2u
2
is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
u.
Because ot+1 = E

ln kot+1jst; ot; ot

and ot+1 =
q
V ar

ln kot+1jst; ot; ot

, the
dynamics of ot and ot can be written as follows:
ot+1 = lnB
 + E [ln kot jst; ot; ot] +  ln qt + F   
2"
2
; (9)
ot+1 =
q
2 (1  ht)2ot + 2"; (10)
where:
E [ln kot jst; ot; ot] = (1  ht)ot + htst; (11)
ht =

ot
u
2
1 +

ot
u
2 : (12)
Equation (11) shows that E [ln kot jst; ot; ot] is a weighted average of the prior
belief, ot, and new information, st, where the variable ht is the weight on new
information. As shown in equation (12), ht is negatively related to u. If the
variance of ut is large, it is di¢ cult to infer ln kot from st and, thus, a small weight is
placed on st. In this way, the variable ht measures the reliability of new information.
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All rms are assumed to have the same ot at date t. However, the beliefs
regarding organization capital, ot, di¤er between rms. Given that all agents in an
economy receive the same information, these agents hold the same beliefs about a
rms organization capital. That is, the beliefs regarding organization capital, ot,
characterize a rms position in the economy. We assume that:
(ot; F ) ~N
0@(eot; 0) ;
24 2t covFt
covFt 
2
F
351A
where eot and 
2
t are the mean and the variance of ot, and covFt is the covariance
between ot and F . We consider the assignment between beliefs regarding organiza-
tion capital and the quality of workers. The wage function depends not only on the
quality of workers, but also on the aggregate state variables: eot, t, :
a
ot and covFt,
where aot is a prevailing standard deviation of ln k
o
t . Let xt = (
e
ot; t; 
a
ot; covFt)
0.
Assume that a rm faces a competitive wage function, w (ln qt : xt). The prot max-
imization problem of a rm is written as follows:
V (ot; ot; F : xt) = maxfln qjtg
8<: (1  )E [ytjot; ot; ln qt]  w (ln qjt : xt)+ R V  ot+1; ot+1; F : xt+1 d s (stjot; ot)
9=;(13)
s:t: equations (7) ; (9); (10)
eot+1 = f (xt) ; t+1 = g (xt) ; 
a
ot+1 = m (xt) ; covFt+1 = n (xt)
where qt =
hR 1
0
qjtdj
i 1

and  s (stjot; ot) is a conditional distribution function of a
signal st, given ot and ot, and functions f (), g (), m () and n () represent rms
expectations about the transition of the aggregate state variables.
We examine a positive assortative matching equilibrium between beliefs regarding
organization capital, ot, and a skill, ln qjt. We rst describe a candidate equilibrium.
Later, we prove that the candidate equilibrium exists. Let  (ot : xt) denote a policy
function of the problem (13). Following the argument in the previous section, the
policy function must satisfy the following:
 (ot : xt) =
q
t
(ot   eot) + q; 8ot: (14)
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That is, a rm chooses the same quality of workers in an equilibrium. Hence,
qt =  (ot : xt). Using equation (14), the dynamics of ln k
o
t and ot are described
by:
ln kot+1 = lnB
 +  ln kot + 

q
t
(ot   eot) + q

+ F + "t
ot+1 = lnB
 +  [(1  ht)ot + ht ln kot ] + 

q
t
(ot   eot) + q

+ F   
2
"
2
+ htu

t
Using the two equations, eot+1, t+1, and covFt+1 can be derived:
eot+1 = lnB
 + eot + q  
2"
2
; (15)
t+1 =
q
21t
2
t + 
2ht2ot + 21tcovFt + 
2
F ; (16)
covFt+1 = 1tcovFt + 
2
F ; (17)
where 1t = +
q
t
is the persistence parameter when organization capital is unob-
servable.
We are ready to dene a recursive positive assortative matching equilibrium be-
tween unobserved organization capital and skill.
Denition 1 A recursive positive assortative matching equilibrium between unob-
served organization capital and skill comprises values of  (ot : xt), V (ot; ot; F : xt),
w (ln qt : xt), f (xt), g (xt), m (xt) and n (xt) that satisfy the following conditions.
1. An individual rm solves its maximization problem (13).
2. Equation (14) is satised to clear the labor market:
3. Expectations are rational: f (xt) = lnB+eot+q 
2
"
2
, g (xt) =
vuut 21t2t + 2ht (aot)2
+21tcovFt + 
2
F
,
m (xt) =
q
2 (1  ht) (aot)2 + 2", n (xt) = 1tcovFt + 2F , where 1t =  +
q
t
, ht =

aot
u
2
1+

aot
u
2 and aot = ot.
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Because aot = ot in equilibrium, ot is used subsequently to denote the aggregate
state variable. Because the labor-market clearing condition and rational expectations
assumption determine the functions  (ot : xt), f (xt), g (xt), m (xt) and n (xt) by
construction, we need to nd a value function and a wage function that are consistent
with the denition of equilibrium. The next theorem derives the value function and
the wage function. The proof of the theorem is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 There exists a unique recursive positive assortative matching equilibrium
between unobserved organization capital and skill. At the equilibrium, a wage function
and a value function are solved by:
w (ln qt : xt) =
 q
t
(1  )E [ytj 1 (ln qt : xt) ; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t
(18)
+
 q
t
1t
Z
V
 
ot+1; ot+1 : xt+1; F

d s
 
stj 1 (ln qt : xt) ; ot

V (ot; ot : xt; F ) =
1X
i=0
is=1

1t+s 1
(1  )E [yt+ijot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t+i
; (19)
where:
E [yt+ijot; ot; F ] =


r
 
1 
exp
1
1  
8>>>><>>>>:
 q + 
e
ot+i +
2ot+i
2
+

1 +  q
t+i
 
E

ot+ijot : F
  eot+i
+

1+
 q
t+i
2
2
V ar

ot+ijot

9>>>>=>>>>;
and 0s=1

1t+s 1
= 1, E

ot+ijot : F
 eot+i = i=11t+i  (ot   eot)+Pix=1x 1=11t+i F
and V ar

ot+ijot

=
Pi
=1
 1
s=1
2
1t+i s
2ht+i 2ot+i  .
Note that the ln qt and V (ot; ot : xt; F ) are strictly increasing functions of ot
and that w (ln qt : xt) is a strictly increasing function of ln qt. Moreover, we know
that capital stock, ln kt, is a strictly increasing function of ot, which means that
the rm believed to have high organization capital is large. Hence, the dynamics
for skills, wages, expected prots, and physical capital stock follow the dynamics of
ot. Although the main focus in this paper is the dynamics of the TFP, it is worth
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emphasizing that the theoretical predictions for persistence and correlation of these
variables are largely consistent with the evidence. For readers who are interested in
the persistence of other variables, we refer to Takii (2008).
Because lnAt depends on ln kot and  (ot : xt), we rst discuss the dynamics of
ln kot and ot. Using the equation (15), we can rewrite the dynamics of ln k
o
t and ot
as follows:
ln kot+1   eot+1 =  [ln kot   eot] +
q
t
(ot   eot) + F + "t ; (20)
ot+1   eot+1 = ht [ln kot   eot] (21)
+

 (1  ht) + q
t

(ot   eot) + F + htut ;
where "t = "t +
2"
2
is normally distributed with the mean 0 and the variance 2".
Equation (20) shows the dynamics of ln kot . The rst term of equation (20)
is inuenced by technological persistence, . That is, if organization capital is
above average, the fraction  of this relative advantage is carried over to the next
period. On the other hand, the second term is inuenced by positive assignment. If
organization capital is believed to be above average, the rm attracts skilled workers
who help the rm to accumulate further organization capital. Note that when q
t
is large, the e¤ect of ot on ln k
o
t+1 is large. The rms with the largest ot derive
the highest benets from a large q
t
because these leading rms attract the most
talented workers, who provide the rms with the best knowledge. Therefore, relative
advantages persist longer.
Note that equation (20) shows that the dynamics of ln kot  eot exhibits a reversion
to the established beliefs plus a rm xed e¤ect, q
t
(ot   eot) +F and the speed of
the reversion is inuenced by the constant parameter . Hence, assignment does not
inuence the persistence of ln kot unless it a¤ects ot. More importantly, it indicates
that if ot   eot is persistent, the slow movement of ot   eot plays a similar role to
an unobserved xed e¤ect.
The dynamics of ot   eot is depicted by equation (21). The rst term captures
how new information inuences the dynamics of beliefs regarding organization capital.
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Managers know that the fraction  of current organization capital a¤ects the next
periods organization capital. However, current organization capital is not observable
and must be inferred from the current TFP. The high TFP can be the result of either
a large temporal shock, ut, or a high level of organization capital. Because managers
put a weight, ht, on new information, the fraction ht of current organization capital
is believed to be translated into the next periods level. New information incorporates
noise. Hence, the ht portion of ut also inuences the posterior beliefs. This e¤ect
is captured by the third term, htut , in equation (21).
The second term of equation (21) captures the e¤ect of the prior belief on the
posterior belief. There are two separate e¤ects. Because there is assignment between
the prior belief and worker quality, the higher that the level of organization capital
is believed to be, a priori, the higher is the quality of workers that the rm can
employ. Given that skilled workers help the rm to accumulate organization capital,
organization capital in the next period is believed to be high. This assignment e¤ect
is captured by q
t
in the second term. On the other hand, because the TFP provides
only noisy information about organization capital, a weight of 1 ht is placed on the
prior belief. Because the fraction  of current organization capital is translated into
organization capital for the next period, the fraction  (1  ht) of the prior belief
inuences the posterior. Overall, the fraction  (1  ht) + qt of the prior belief
inuences the posterior.
We can rst prove the existence of a unique stationary distribution. The proof
of the proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose that  2 (0; 1), u
"
2 (0;1) ; q
"
2 (0;1) and F
"
2 (0;1).
There exists the steady state value of xt, which is denoted by x1. At the steady state,
the dynamics of an individual rm are described by the following vector autoregression
(VAR):
Ot+1 =MOt + F+ t; (22)
where M 
24 ; q1
h1;  (1  h1) + q1
35, Ot 
24 D ln kot
Dot
35, F 
24 F
F
35, t 
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24 "t
h1ut
35, D ln kot  ln kot   eo1 and Dot  ot   eo1. Moreover, there exist
functions  () and  (; ) such that:
h1 = 

u
"

2 (0; 1) ; (23)
where 0

u
"

< 0, limu
"
!0 

u
"

= 1 and limu
"
!1 

u
"

= 0, and:
q
1
= 

q
"
;
u
"
;
F
"

2
 
0;
1  
F
q
+ 
!
; (24)
where 1

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

> 0, 2

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

> 0, 3

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

< 0, limq
"
!0

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

=
0, and limu
"
;!1

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

= 1 F
q
+
.
Equation (23) shows that h1 is negatively related to u" . If the standard deviation
of a noise term is relatively large, rms cannot learn much and h1 is small. Because
equation (23) shows that h1 and u" have a one-to-one relationship in the steady
state, without loss of generality, h1 can be treated as an exogenous parameter.
As we discussed before, the assignment e¤ect is captured by q
1 . Hence, equation
(24) shows what inuences the persistence through the assignment mechanism. First,
it shows that the large q
"
induces a large q
1 . This is the e¤ect discussed in the
previous section.
Second, q
1 is increasing in
u
"
. When information is noisy, rational agents ignore
new information and rely more on their prior beliefs to make inferences about the
current level of organization capital. Therefore, rational agents cannot change their
beliefs very much. This makes the variance of ot small and, therefore, makes
q
1
large. Hence, more noisy information is likely to increase the persistence.
Finally, when F
"
is larger, the assignment e¤ect is smaller. The large variation in
a rm-specic xed factor, F is reected by the large variation in beliefs regarding
organization capital, 1 in the long run. Therefore, it reduces the relative impor-
tance of assignment on the persistence, q
1 . This indicates that a rise in F may
not increase the persistence of organization capital.
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With some additional conditions, we can also prove global stability. The proof
of the proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose that  2 (0; 1), u
"
2 (0;1) ; q
"
2 (0;1) and F
"
2 (0;1).
Suppose also that q
"
F
"
 2(1 )h1
2[1 2(1 h1)] . Then, the stationary distribution is globally
stable.
Owing to proposition 4, we presume that the productivity dynamics of the es-
tablished rms can be approximated by the productivity dynamics under stationary
distribution, which we assume in the next section.
4 Productivity Dynamics
In this section, we analytically examine how skill heterogeneity, noisy information
and a rm xed heterogeneity inuence the dynamics of di¤erence in the TFP. Let
us dene the relative productivity by D lnAt = lnAt E [lnA]. The dynamics of the
relative productivity and its expectation in the steady state are derived from equation
(22), as follows:
At+1 =M
AAt + FA + vt (25)
whereAt =
24 D lnAt
E [D lnAtjot]
35,MA =M+  q
1h1
24 1  1
1  1
35, FA =
24 FA
FA
35, vt =24 vt
0
35, FA = 1 +  q1F and vt = "t   ut + ut+1 is normally distributed with the
mean 0 and the variance

1+2[1 h1]2
h1[1 2(1 h1)]

2"

=
h
h1
1 h1 + 1 + 
2 (1  h1)
i
2u

.
Comparing equation (25) with equation (22), we can point out an important
di¤erence: the parameter  q
1 in equation (25) does not appear in equation (22). If
 is 0, equation (25) is equivalent to equation (22) except for the error term. The
parameter  q
1 measures the static assignment e¤ect that increases the sensitivity of
productivity to beliefs: if a rm is perceived to have large organization capital, it can
attract talented workers, which increases the productivity of the rm.
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The sensitivity of productivity to beliefs inuences the dynamics of productivity
for two reasons. First, it magnies the impacts of a rm-specic factor on the pro-
ductivity, FA =

1 +  q
1

F . A rm with a large rm-specic factor is productive
not only because it directly improves productivity, but also because it attracts excel-
lent workers. In other words, a rm xed e¤ect in the TFP dynamics can already be
magnied by the assignment. Second, it magnies the impact of a prediction error,
 q
1h1 [D lnAt   E [D lnAtjot]]. When the realized TFP exceeds the expected
TFP, people update their beliefs. The updated beliefs attract better workers and
raise productivity in the next period.
Note that, similarly to the dynamics of organization capital, the dynamics of
relative productivity exhibits a reversion to the expected relative productivity plus
a rm-specic xed e¤ect, D lnAt+1 = b1D lnAt + Ft + vt, where b1 =  +
 q
1h1,
Ft =

q
1  
 q
1h1

E [D lnAtjot] + FA. Hence, as long as E [D lnAtjot] moves
slowly, it is di¢ cult to distinguish the expectation from a rm-specic xed factor.
We examine the properties of productivity dynamics in detail below.
Extreme Cases : It is instructive to start with the extreme cases in which there
is no assignment e¤ect q
"
= 0 and the information is perfectly noisy u
"
= 1. The
following proposition can be easily proved.
Proposition 5 1. Suppose that q
"
= 0. Then:
D lnAt+1 = D lnAt + F + vt (26)
E

D lnAt+1jot+1

= h1D lnAt +  (1  h1)E [D lnAtjot] + F
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2. Suppose that u
"
=1. Then:
D lnAt+1 = D lnAt + (1  )E [D lnAtjot] + vt; (27)
E [D lnAtjot] =

1 +  

1 
F
q
+1

F
1 

+ 1 F
q
+1
 ; if F > 0
E [D lnAtjot] = E [D lnA0jo0] ; if F = 0
Equation (26) shows that if there is no skill variation and, therefore, there is no
assignment problem, there is no link between expectation and productivity. Even if
people believe the organization capital in a rm is high, when there is no assignment
mechanism, there is no way that beliefs can inuence productivity. That is, in order
for the expectation to inuence real productivity, the assignment between beliefs and
skill is necessary.
Equation (27) shows that if At does not contain any information for predicting the
level of organization capital, the expected relative productivity converges to constant
values, and the dynamics of relative productivity exhibits a reversion to the fraction
of the values. Hence, the expected relative productivity itself plays the role of an
unobserved rm-specic xed e¤ect.
When there is variation in the rm-specic xed factors (F > 0), because the
factors are observable, the expectation is inuenced by these rm-specic factors.
Therefore, the observed xed variation coincides with the amplied rm heterogene-
ity.
More interestingly, even if there is no variation in a rm-specic xed factor
(F = 0), beliefs can di¤er. Because there is no information to update beliefs, beliefs
never change and initial prior beliefs inuence beliefs even in the long run. In this
way, the model can endogenize the xed e¤ect in the productivity dynamics without
any real rm-specic heterogeneity.
General Case: Let us examine a more general case. Suppose that  2 (0; 1),
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u
"
2 (0;1) ; q
"
2 (0;1) and F
"
2 (0;1). Let us dene AFt =
24 D lnAFt
E

D lnAFt jot

35
where D lnAFt = D lnAt   F A and F A = FA1 11 . Note that E [D lnAt] = F A.
That is, F A measures the long-run average of the relative productivity and D lnA
F
t
measures the deviation of the relative productivity from its long-run average. Then,
the following equation can be derived.
AFt+1 =M
AAFt + vt; (28)
Let 11 and 21 denote the eigenvalues of the matrix MA. Then, it is shown that
11 =  +
q
1 < 1 and 21 =  (1  h1) < 1. Hence, equation (28) is covariance
stationary. Note that 11 is equivalent to the persistence parameter.
In order to analyze the persistence and diversity of relative productivity, we mea-
sure the correlation between the current relative productivity and its lagged relative
productivities, D lnAj, and the variance of the relative productivity, V ar [D lnAt]. It
can be shown that D lnAj, can be decomposed into the between to overall variance ra-
tio,
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
, which measures the permanent persistence, and the within-correlation,
D lnAFt j, which measures the temporal persistence, and that V ar [D lnAt] can be de-
composed into within-variance, V ar

D lnAFt

, and between-variance, V ar [F A], by
the following equations.
D lnAj =

1  V ar [F

A]
V ar [D lnAt]

D lnAFt j +
V ar [F A]
V ar [D lnAt]
; (29)
V ar [D lnAt] = V ar

D lnAFt

+ V ar [F A] (30)
The following proposition is used to derive our theoretical predictions on the
persistence and the diversity of the relative productivity, D lnAt. The proof of the
proposition is provided in the Appendix.
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Proposition 6
V ar [F A] =

1 +  q
1
2
(1  11)2
2F ;
V ar

D lnAFt

=
264

1 +  q
1
2
(h1)
2
1  211
+ 1
375 2"
h1

1  2 (1  h1)
 ;
and
D lnAF j = zE[D lnAF j]j 1;
E[D lnAF j]j 1 = 
j 1
11 ;
where z = 11
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
+

1 +  q
1

h1

1  V ar[E[D lnA
F
t jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]

and
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
=

1+
 q
1
2
(h1)2
1 211
1+
 q
1
2
(h1)2
1 211
+1
.
Proposition 6 shows that the measure for the persistence of the expected deviation,
E[D lnAF j]j 1, is entirely determined by the persistence parameter, 11. It means
that 11 also measures the persistence of beliefs.
In addition, it shows that the between-variance V ar [F A] and the within-variance
V ar

D lnAFt

are inuenced by 11 = +
q
1 , which measures the persistence of be-
liefs, and the sensitivity of productivity to beliefs,  q
1 . It suggests that the variance
of relative productivity can be largely inuenced by the assignment mechanism.
Finally, proposition 6 shows that the within-correlation is determined by the per-
sistence measure of the expected deviation E[D lnAF j]j 1 times a factor z. The
inuence of E[D lnAF j]j 1 represents the importance of the persistence of beliefs
for the within-correlation. The factor z is constructed by the weighted average
of the persistence parameter, 11 and the impacts of new information from lnAt 1,
1 +  q
1

h1, which changes the beliefs on organization capital and, therefore,
the assigned skilled workers in the next period. The reliability of the expectation,
25
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
, plays the role of a weight. This shows that, if the expectation is per-
fectly reliable,
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
= 1, the within-correlation is entirely explained by the
persistence of beliefs, D lnAF j = E[D lnAF j]j = 
j
11. As far as
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
< 1,
new information has some values.
Knowing that 11 =  + 

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

,  q
1 =  

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

and h1 =


u
"

, we can rst derive the analytical predictions on the diversity of the relative
productivity. The following proposition can be easily proved.
Proposition 7 For any j
dV ar [F A]
dq
"
> 0;
dV ar [F A]
du
"
> 0;
dV ar [F A]
d
> 0;
dV ar [F A]
d 
> 0
dV ar

D lnAFt

dq
"
> 0;
dV ar

D lnAFt

dF
"
< 0;
dV ar

D lnAFt

d
> 0;
dV ar

D lnAFt

d 
> 0;
dV ar [D lnAt]
dq
"
> 0;
dV ar [D lnAt]
d
> 0;
dV ar [D lnAt]
d 
> 0:
Proposition 7 shows that, among q
"
, u
"
and F
"
, only an increase in q
"
, has
unambiguous predicted e¤ects on V ar [D lnAt]. Because the assignment magnies
a small di¤erences in a rm xed e¤ect, a rise in q
"
increases the between-variance
and the within-variance, and, therefore, the overall variance.
In order to understand its mechanism, proposition 7 also provides the comparative
statics with respect to  and  , where the parameters  and  measure the importance
of skill for the accumulation of organization capital and for the current production,
respectively. The parameter  inuences the persistence of beliefs, 11 =  +
q
1 ,
whereas  inuences the sensitivity of productivity to expectation,  q
1 . Therefore,
the comparative statics with respect to  and  are useful to understand the two
separate e¤ects that the assignment mechanism has. Proposition 7 shows that,
regardless of the role of skill, the more important that skill is in the rm, the more
important is assignment, and, therefore, the more diverse is productivity.
Although an increase in u
"
raises the between-variance, V ar [F A], its e¤ects on
the within-variance are ambiguous. Similarly, an increase in F
"
reduces the within-
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variance, V ar

D lnAFt

, but its impacts on the between-variance are ambiguous.
One may be surprised by the fact that an increase in rm-specic heterogeneity may
reduce between-variance, V ar [F A]. This is because an increase in
F
"
reduces q
1 ,
and therefore, the dynamic assignment e¤ect, q
1 and the static assignment e¤ect,
 q
1 . Therefore, the amplication through the assignment is smaller, which may
o¤set the direct positive e¤ect on V ar [F A].
Next, we derive the analytical predictions on persistence of the relative produc-
tivity. The following proposition can be easily proved.
Proposition 8 For any j
dE[D lnAF j]j 1
dq
"
> 0;
dE[D lnAF j]j 1
du
"
;
> 0;
dE[D lnAF j]j 1
dF
"
< 0;
dE[D lnAF j]j 1
d
> 0;
d
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
dq
"
> 0
d
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
d
> 0:;
d
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
d 
> 0:
Hence, there exists j such that for all j > j
dD lnAF j
dq
"
> 0;
dD lnAF j
du
"
> 0;
dD lnAF j
dF
"
< 0;
dD lnAF j
d
> 0
and
dD lnAj
dq
"
> 0;
dD lnAj
d
> 0;
dD lnAj
d 
> 0:
Similarly to proposition 7, the proposition 8 shows that only an increase in q
"
unambiguously increases the persistence of productivity after enough time has passed.
An increase in q
"
not only increases E[D lnAF j]j 1, but also increases the between-
to-overall variance ratio,
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
. Because actual productivity is subjected to
temporal shocks, it can deviate from beliefs temporally. However, as time passes, an
increase in the persistence of beliefs dominates the temporal disturbance and increases
the persistence of productivity itself. This is what Proposition 8 says: Note also that
both  and  can increase the persistence of relative productivity. This indicates
that, although the assignment raises both the persistence of beliefs and the sensitivity
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of productivity to the beliefs, both inuence the persistence of productivity in the
same direction.
An increase in F
"
and a reduction in u
"
unambiguously reduce within-correlation,
D lnAF j, because they lower the persistence parameter 11. However, the e¤ects on
D lnAj are ambiguous because the e¤ects of
F
"
and u
"
on the between to overall
variance ratio,
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
, are ambiguous.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we use the theory to quantify the importance of three factors, q
"
,
F
"
, and u
"
as the sources of persistence and diversity of productivity. Owing to
proposition 6, the measure of persistence and diversity can be derived as a function
of technological persistence, , a measure of the accuracy of information, h1, the
heterogeneity of a rm xed e¤ect, F , technological disturbance ", the measure
of a dynamic assignment e¤ect, q
1 , which inuences the persistence of beliefs, and
the measure of a static assignment e¤ect,  q
1 , which inuences the sensitivity of
productivity to the beliefs. We identify these parameters to be consistent with the
dynamics and variations of the TFP of a rm and the ratio of the average wage to
the average labor productivity.
We constructed a rm level TFP, Aft, using BSJBSA from 1994 to 2004. BSJBSA
is based on a survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
every year. The BSJBSA covers all the enterprises with 50 employees or more and
more than a 30 million yen capitalization that are at least partly engaged in mining,
manufacturing, wholesale and retail sales, and restaurant activities in Japan. Hence,
the data set contains all relatively established rms in these industries, which are
more likely to satisify one of our steady state conditions that 2o1 is constant for all
rms. Although we can obtain data for the publicly traded rms, many established
rms are not traded. Hence, our data set would be more appropriate for the analyisis
of the assignment model.
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A particular feature of BSJBSA is that it is a survey of rms, not establishments,
which are commonly used in the study of productivity dynamics. Because more
publicly accessible data is available at the rm level, it would be easier for people to
embrace their beliefs regarding the capability of a rm than their beliefs regarding
an establishment. In this regard, this data is more desirable for the analysis of our
model than is the establishment data available in other countries. More discussions
about data can be found in Matsuura and Kiyota (2004), Fukao and Kwon (2006),
and Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005).
In order to obtain a reasonable correlation measure, in our study, we retain only
the rms for which there are data available in all years. Because we are interested
in the assignment within an industry, we use industries that have more than ve
rms for all years, where industries are classied by the three-digit industry code
in the BSJBSA. In addition, we drop the observations with nonpositive values for
value added, number of employed workers or capital stock. After these deletions,
our balanced panel data set contains 68,838 observations.
We estimate D lnAft by D lnAft =
h
ln yft  
Pmt
j ln yft
mt
i
  
h
ln kft  
Pmt
j ln kft
mt
i
,
where yft and kft are the value added per worker and the physical capital per worker,
respectively, in the fth rm in year t, and mt is the number of rms in the three-digit
industry in year t. The parameter  is calibrated by the average capital share
E[rtkft]
E[yft]
,
which is 0.224. Detailed data construction can be found in the Appendix.
In order to calibrate six parameters , q
1 , h1, 
2
F , 
2
" and
 q
1 from the data,
we use several sources of information. The rst source of information comes from
productivity dynamics:
D lnAt = b1D lnAt 1 + b2E

D lnAt 1jot 1

+ FA + vt 1; (31)
E [D lnAtjot] = b3D lnAt 1 + b4E

D lnAt 1jot 1

+ FA; (32)
where b1 =  +
 q
1h1; b2 =
q
1  
 q
1h1; b3 = h1 +
 q
1h1 and b4 = b2 +
4This is between 0.20, calibrated by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), and 0.25, calibrated by Samaniego
(2006).
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(b1   b3). Given  q1 , we can choose ,
q
1 and h1, which are matched up to
b1, b2 and b3. The second source of information comes from the between-variance,
V ar (F A), and the within-variance, V ar

D lnAFt

. We estimate these variances, and
use them to calibrate 2F and 
2
" using proposition 6. Finally, in order to calibrate the
static assignment e¤ect,  q
1 , we take the expectation on both sides of equation (18)
in the steady state. Using equation (19), we can obtain the following relationship:
 q
1
=
E[wt]
(1 )E[yt]  


1  
11

1+ 
11
1  E[wt]
(1 )E[yt]
:
where 11 = +
q
1 , the ratio of the average wage to the average labor productiv-
ity, E[wt]
E[yt]
is estimated to be 0:65 and we assume that  = 0:95. We can derive a unique
closed-form solution of

; q
1 ; h1; 
2
F ; 
2
";
 q
1
0
from

b1;b2; b3; V ar (F

A) ; V ar

D lnAFt

; E[wt]
(1 )E[yt]
0
and nd a one-to-one relationship between these estimates and the calibrated para-
meters.
In order to obtain information on b1; b2, b3 and F A from the data, we extract
information from the productivity dynamics equations, (31) and (32). First, we
estimate b3 and b4, and construct E [D lnAtjot] by the following procedure. Note
that the following regression equation can be derived from equation (32):
D lnAt = b3D lnAt 1 + b4E

D lnAt 1jot 1

+ FA +$t; (33)
where $t = D lnAt E [D lnAtjot]. Assume that E

D lnAt 1jot 1

= D lnAft 2.
First, we estimate equation (33) using AllenanoBover/BlundellBond Estimation,
although we exclude D lnAft j where j  3 from its instruments because, once
E

D lnAt jjot j

j  2 are controlled, D lnAft j j > 3 are not correlated with
D lnAft 1. It gives us b^3 and b^4, which are the estimated values of b3 and b4. Sec-
ond, then we construct F^A by F^A =
PT
t D lnAt (b^3D lnAt 1+b^4E[D lnAt 1jot 1])
T
. Third,
we construct E [D lnAtjot] using equation (32) if E

D lnAt 1jot 1

exists and set
b^3 + b^4

D lnAt 1 + F^A if E

D lnAt 1jot 1

is missing. Fifth, we repeat the
same procedure until the estimated E

D lnAt 1jot 1

converges to the assumed
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D lnAt 1 E

D lnAt 1jot 1

# of Obs.
D lnAt 0.471 (0.013) 0.242 (0.026) 56322
D lnAt 1   E

D lnAt 1jot 1

# of Obs.
D lnAt   E [D lnAtjot] 0.165 (0.040) 56322
Table 1: Regression Results
WC-Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. denotes signicance at
the one percent level.
E

D lnAt 1jot 1

. This process gives us the estimates of b^3, b^4 and F^A. Knowing
that 11 = b3 + b4, we estimate the long-run average relative productivity F A by
F^ A =
F^A
1 (b^3+b^4) .
Given the estimated value of E [D lnAtjot], we estimate b1 and b2. Note that
the di¤erence between equation (31) and (33) is just their error terms, vt 1 and $t.
Although vt 1 = "t 1   ut 1 + ut is correlated with D lnAt 1, $t is not. Because
a large lnAt 1 not only indicates a large ln kot 1 but also indicates a large temporal
luck ut 1, vt 1 is correlated with D lnAt 1. When rational agents predict a future
lnAt, they e¢ ciently utilize this information too. That is why the prediction error,
$t, is orthogonal to D lnAt 1. In other words, b3 is a biased estimator of b1. This
di¤erence is more accurate when we subtract (32) from (31):
D lnAt   E [D lnAtjot] = b5

D lnAt 1   E

D lnAt 1jot 1

+ vt 1; (34)
where b5 = b1   b3 =  (1  h1). That is, a large di¤erence between b1 and b3
indicates a small h1. Using this equation, we can identify b^1 = b^3 + b^5. From the
theoretical restriction on parameters, we can identify b^2 = b^4   b^5.
We estimate equation (34) by AllenanoBover/BlundellBond Estimation pro-
vided that the error term follows a rst-order moving average process because vt 1 =
"t 1   ut 1 + ut . As instruments, we use D lnAt 3 for the di¤erence equation
and D lnAt 2   D lnAt 3 for the level equation rather than the standard lagged
variables because the standard instruments can be weak. The reasons relate to
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q
1 h1 
2
F 
2
"
 q
1
0.298 0.415 0.447 0.001 0.019 2.535
Table 2: The Calibrated Parameters
the specic structure of the equation (34). If information is nearly perfect, then
b1  b3 and, therefore, the lagged variables are less likely to be correlated with
D lnAt 1   E

D lnAt 1jot 1

.
In fact, the theoretical predictions on the correlations of relative productivity are
independent of the choice of b^5. In order to understand the reason for this, consider
proposition 6. It shows that the correlation is decomposed into 11, z and
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
,
and 11 is identied by b^3 + b^4; z is determined by

1 +  q
1

h1 = b^3 and 11;
and
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
is taken from the data. Hence, it is determined without knowing b^5.
However, the choice of b^5 may change the results of our counterfactual exercises. It
turns out that the most of our quantitative results are not sensitive to the choice of
b^5. We discuss this issue in detail later.
Table 1 reports the results from the regression equation (33) when the estimated
E [D lnAtjot] converges to the assumed E [D lnAtjot] and the results from the re-
gression equation (34). Table 1 shows that, after controlling for current relative
productivity, the constructed belief about relative productivity continues to inuence
relative productivity in the next year. Note that E

D lnAt 1jot 1

is constructed
from past observations. Our regression results are consistent with the hypothesis
that people learn about a rms capacity from its past performance and form beliefs
that inuence future performance. Table 1 also indicates that we cannot perfectly
infer the level of organization capital from the TFP.
Using our estimate, we can calibrate our structural parameters. Table 2 reports
our calibration results. It shows fairly low values of 2F and 
2
", 0.001 and 0.019. Note
also that the implied values of the variation of a rm-specic factor are smaller than
that of transitory shocks 2F < 
2
". As shown in Table 3, our estimates of V ar (F

A)
and V ar

D lnAFt

are 0.171 and 0.064, respectively. It indicates that the relatively
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Figure 1: The Persistence of Relative Productivity Between Firms
large between-variance of lnAt can mostly be explained by the amplication though
assignment. We use these calibrated values to examine the predictions of our model.
Persistence and Disparity of Productivity: We compare the predicted correla-
tions with the correlations observed in the data. Our measures of correlation and vari-
ance are constructed by using equations (29) and (30), where V ar [F A], V ar

D lnAFt

and D lnAFt j are constructed by the sample variance of F^

A and D lnAt   F^ A and the
simple correlation of D lnAt   F^ A and D lnAt+j   F^ A, respectively. Our theoretical
counterparts are constructed by using proposition 6.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our simulations. Figure 1 shows that the pre-
dicted correlation sequence almost perfectly explains the overall movement of actual
correlation. We use this model to conduct several counterfactual experiments.
We rst ask What would happen, if there were no assignments in the economy
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Figure 2: The Decomposition of the Role of Assignment on the Persistence
(q
"
= 0)? This experiment can be done by assuming that q
1 =
 q
1 = 0 and the
other parameters are constant. Figure 1 shows that, if q
"
= 0, the correlation of
relative productivity diminishes to less than 10 percent after 2 years. That is, the
relative temporal advantages disappear quickly if there are no benets from positive
assignment.
We also conduct an experiment involving no variation in the rm-specic factor
F
"
= 0. When F
"
= 0, q
1 becomes larger. This indirect e¤ect is also computed
using the equations in the proof of proposition 3. Compared to the case of q
"
= 0,
the reduction of the correlation is slow. The correlation of the relative productivity
is about 34 percent even after 10 years. This indicates that the assignment e¤ect
seems strong even without rm heterogeneity.
In addition, we ask What would happen if u
"
= 0?. When u
"
= 0, h1 = 1
and q
1 becomes smaller. In the same way as the case of
F
"
= 0, these combined
e¤ects are reported in Figure 1. It shows that an improvement in information causes
only slight changes in the persistence of productivity.
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To understand the impacts of assignment on the persistence, Figure 2 decomposes
the e¤ect of assignment into the dynamic e¤ect,  = 0 ( q
1 = 0), which inuences
the persistence of beliefs, and the static e¤ect,  = 0 (  q
1 = 0), which inuences
the sensitivity of productivity to beliefs. It shows that both the dynamic e¤ect and
the static e¤ect have sizable impacts on the persistence. However, the compounded
e¤ects are much bigger, which explains large reductions of the persistence found in
the model without assignment in Figure 1.
Table 3 shows an alternative decomposition, which assists in understanding our
quantitative result5. When there is no assignment, not only 11 drops by 58 percent,
from 0.713 to 0.298, but z also drops by 75 percent from 0.547 to 0.136. Both e¤ects
explain a rapid reduction of the correlation in Figure 1. No assignment also causes
a large reduction of
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
, from 0.73 to 0.05. This explains why a reduction in
correlation in Figure 1 is so large. Table 3 also reveals the reason behind a change
in
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
. Although no assignment reduces within-variance, the reduction of
between-variance is more drastic than that of within-variance. Table 3 shows that if
there is no assignment, the between-variance drops by 99 percent. It indicates that
the most of between variations can be explained by the amplication through the
assignment mechanism.
Table 3 can also show the impacts of  = 0 ( q
1 = 0) and  = 0 (
 q
1 = 0) on the
persistence. First, the lack of the dynamic assignment e¤ect, q
1 = 0, reduces 11
and z, which causes a rapid reduction of the correlation shown in Figure 2. Second,
although the static assignment e¤ect cannot inuence 11, it can greatly inuence
z. A reduction in  lowers the impact of changes in beliefs on productivity, which
reduces not only the importance of new information,

1 +  q
1

h1, but also the
reliability of beliefs,
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
. Both reduces z. This explains why a big
initial decline exists when  = 0 in Figure 2. Third, it also shows that although
5Note that as F and " are chosen to meet between- and within-variances, the benchmark values
of the variance are the same as the statistics constructed from the data.
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11 z
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
V ar [D lnAt] V ar (F

A) V ar

D lnAFt

Benchmark 0.713 0.547 0.729 0.234 0.171 0.064
q
"
= 0 0.298 0.136 0.049 0.047 0.002 0.045
 = 0 0.298 0.437 0.343 0.083 0.028 0.054
 = 0 0.713 0.153 0.231 0.059 0.014 0.045
F
"
= 0 0.938 0.875 0 0.198 0 0.198
u
"
= 0 0.703 0.810 0.726 0.212 0.154 0.058
Table 3: The Decomposition of Persistence and Variance
both the lack of the dynamic e¤ect ( q
1 = 0) and that of the static e¤ect (
 q
1 = 0)
have sizable impacts on
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
, the compounded impacts are much greater. These
observations conrm that the large impacts of assignment on the persistency can be
generated by the combinations of both the slow adjustment of the beliefs and a rise
in the sensitivity of productivity to the beliefs.
When there is no rm heterogeneity, by denition,
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
= 0. However, 11
and z increase to 0.938 and 0.875, respectively. This is because a reduction in F
"
increases the dynamic assignment e¤ect, q
1 and the static assignment e¤ect,
 q
1 .
It explains why a reduction in F
"
brings about a slow reduction of correlation in
Figure 1.
Finally, even if information is perfect, u
"
= 0, 11 and
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
do not change
much. This explains why an improvement in information does not change the persis-
tence of productivity in Figure 1 very much. Note that because the TFP is realized
after the employment decisions, even if the information contained in the TFP is per-
fect, the assignment must rely on the beliefs. Small changes in 11 suggests that,
even when the TFP is perfectly informative, the slow adjustment of beliefs can be an
important factor for the persistence of productivity dynamics.
Table 3 can also provide information about how each factor inuences the overall
variance of relative productivity, V ar [D lnAt]. When
q
"
= 0, V ar [D lnAt] drops by
79 percent, from 0.234 to 0.047. Table 3 shows that the strong reduction of between-
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variance is the main reason for this large reduction. Table 3 also suggests that,
similarly to the e¤ect on the persistence, although both  = 0 and  = 0 have large
impacts on the reduction in overall variance, the compounded e¤ect is bigger.
On the other hand, when F
"
= 0 or u
"
= 0, a change in V ar [D lnAt] is small.
A small reduction of overall variance under F
"
= 0 is surprising. When F
"
= 0,
V ar (F A) = 0 by denition. Because a reduction of
F
"
increases the persistence
parameter through the dynamic assignment e¤ect, 11 =  +
q
1 and the static
assignment e¤ect,  q
1 , it greatly increases V ar

D lnAFt

. A rise in the within-
variance mostly o¤sets the reduction of the between-variance. It indicates that if the
assignment mechanism is important, reducing the variations in rm-specic factors
does not change the disparity of productivity very much.
The Robustness of the Results: Our results are fairly robust. Table 4 provides
a summary of our robustness checks. More comprehensive results for the robustness
checks are reported in the Appendix 2.
First, we examine how much the results are sensitive to changes in b5. The theory
predicts that the possible range of b5 is between 0 and
E[w]b3
(1 )E[yt] + b4. When b5 is 0,
b1 = b3. In this case, the TFP can perfectly predict organization capital, u" = 0.
When b5 =
E[w]b3
(1 )E[yt] + b4,
q
1 must be 0. That is, skill does not have any impacts
on the accumulation of organization capital. In order to obtain the robust rsults,
we set max b5 =
E[w]b3
(1 )E[yt] + b4   0:001. Our benchmark estimate is located between
these values.
Table 4 shows that most of the important results are insensitive to changes in
b5. Assignment has large impacts on the persistence and diversity of the relative
productivity. The impact of the noisy information on the persistence and the diversity
of relative productivity is minor. A change in rm heterogeneity does not change
the diversity of relative productivity very much.
The reason is as follows. Note that when b5 is set at the minimized (maximized)
value, b2 is set to be the maximized (minimized) value, which largely inuences our
37
min b5 min b5 max b5 max b5 COMPUSTAT COMPUSTAT
Statistics D lnA5 V ar [D lnAt] D lnA5 V ar [D lnAt] D ln y5 V ar [D ln yt]
Benchmark 0.767 0.234 0.767 0.234 0.619 0.423
q
"
= 0 0.067 0.049 0.121 0.049 0.027 0.128
 = 0 0.282 0.075 0.766 0.233 0.168 0.188
 = 0 0.396 0.073 0.122 0.049 0.209 0.154
F
"
= 0 0.692 0.191 0.222 0.193 0.510 0.372
u
"
= 1 0.767 0.234 0.710 0.270 0.628 0.400
Table 4: Robustness of the Results
The benchmark value of V ar [D lnAt] is the same as the estimates from the data by
construction. The benchmark of D lnA5 is almost the same as the estimates from
the data (D lnA5 = 0:767 by BSJBSA, D ln y5 = 0:637 by COMPUSTAT).
calibrations of q
1 . As workers can contribute to the rm by increasing output
and/or increasing organization capital for the future, if there are no investment e¤ects
of skill,  = 0, skilled workers should be extremely productive for current production
in order to be consistent with the data. Otherwise, rms would not pay observed high
wages for workers ( E[wt]
(1 )E[yt] =
E[wt]
E[yt] rE[k] = 0:83). This e¤ect o¤sets the lack of the
dynamic assignment e¤ect. That is why a change in b5 causes sizable changes in the
impacts of  = 0 and  = 0 on the persistence and diversity of relative productivity.
in Table 4. This argument indicates that, even if one has an extreme view that
skilled workers are not important for the accumulation of knowledge in a rm, the
strong impacts of assignment cannot be rejected.
There is one exception. Table 4 shows that the impacts of F
"
= 0 on the
persistence of relative productivity can be sensitive to the choice of b5. When b5 is set
at its maximum value, F
"
= 0 results in D lnA5 = 0:222, which is signicantly smaller
than in other cases. In this case, because q
1 is assumed to be almost 0, 11  .
This means that a reduction of rm heterogeneity does not increase 11. Because
F
"
= 0 means
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
= 0 by denition, the correlation of relative productivity
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should drop. However, note that, even in this extreme case, after ve years, the lack of
assignment still has larger impacts on the reduction of the correlation, D lnA5 = 0:121.
That is, we cannot change the conclusion that a reduction of assignment e¤ect has
more drastic impacts on the persistence than that of rm heterogeneity, at least in
the short run.
We also conduct robustness checks using an alternative dataset. It is well-known
that the Japanese economy su¤ered from a large productivity slowdown during the
1990s [e.g., Hayashi and Prescott (2002)]. Although the previous literature reveals
that, similarly to other countries, the productivity di¤erences in Japanese rms were
large and persistent in this period [e.g., Fukao and Kwon (2006)], the literature also
found that, during 1997, relatively productive rms exited from the market more
than did unproductive rms, which is unusual [e.g., Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota
(2005)]. One may wonder whether this inuences the results of this paper.
In order to examine this possibility, we use a COMPUSTAT dataset containing
data between 1970 and 2004. Because most of the companies in COMPUSTAT do
not report labor costs, we are not able to construct the TFP. Therefore, as a proxy,
we measure the labor productivity by sales per employee. For this exercise, we use
a three-digit industry code to obtain enough rms in an industry and retain rms
with more than 10 observations and industries that have more than ve rms for
all years. We also delete observations with nonpositive values for sales, number of
employees or expenses (= Data41+Data189 in COMPUSTAT). This leaves 84,686
observations for our analysis. We set  = 0:25 and E(w)
E(y)
= 0:63 6. Using the same
6The number  = 0:25 is taken from Samaniego (2006) and E(w)E(y) = 0:63 is estimated by applying
the method used in Takii (2008). It turns out that 0.63 is the value for the labor share used in
Samaniego (2006).
Note that E(w)E(y) can be still used for our calibration although we use sales per employee as a
proxiy of labor productivity. In order to apply our method to the dynamics of sales per worker, we
implicitly assume that a rm can employ physical capital stock and intermediate goods after the TFP
is realized. Assume that the production function is yt = Atktm
m
t , where mt is intermediate goods
and the price for the intermediate goods is pm. After optimally choosing the intermediate goods,
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procedure as before, we obtained parameters. Table 4 reports the summaries of our
counterfactual experiments using COMPUSTAT. As it shows, the overall result is the
same. It indicates that our results are less likely to be subject to the Japanese-specic
environment.
In summary, these exercises consistently suggest that positive assortative match-
ing accounts for a large component of the observed persistence and disparity of a
rms relative productivity, and the large impacts of positive assortative matching
can be explained by the compounded impacts of the slow adjustment of beliefs and
an increase in the sensitivity of productivity to beliefs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a dynamic assignment model between the skills of workers
and unobserved rm-specic knowledge, which we term a rms organization capital,
to account for observed large and persistent productivity di¤erences between rms.
We can analytically show that when the assignment between the beliefs regarding or-
ganization capital and skill exists, the slow adjustment of unobserved heterogeneous
expected relative productivity can play a role similar to an unobserved xed e¤ect in
the productivity dynamics. Our quantitative exercises suggest that the assignment
mechanism that causes the sluggish movement of beliefs and a rise in the sensitiv-
ity of productivity to the beliefs have quantitatively large impacts on the observed
persistence and disparity of productivity. In contrast, rm-specic heterogeneity and
noisy information have only modest impacts.
At this point, it is appropriate to discuss how friction may inuence the results
in this paper. Frictions such as search costs and training cost cannot themselves
the production function is expressed as yt = xe~ut~kot q
 
t k

t , where x =

m
pm
 m
1 m , ~kot = (k
o
t )
1
1 m ,
~ut =
ut
1 m ,  
 =  1 m and 
 = 1 m . Hence, what we need to calibrate is
 q
"
, but not  q" .
Because the value added is proportional to sales under the CobbDouglas production function, our
estimate provides the moment we need.
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explain large productivity di¤erences, but they can certainly act as an additional
source of persistence in our model. However, they may induce the opposite e¤ect,
too. As suggested by Acemoglu (1997), a frictional economy increases mismatches7,
which reduces the persistence of productivity. Hence, the overall e¤ect is uncertain.
More interestingly, these frictions are likely to interact with the positive feedback
mechanism proposed in this paper. Although we cannot predict the consequences of
all possible interactions, the previous literature suggests that there may be multiple
equilibria [see the survey by Burdett and Coles (1999)]. This means that small
changes in skill variations might have more drastic impacts on the persistence and
diversity of productivity. This is an interesting topic for future research.
As a nal point, we emphasize that the implications of the obtained results o¤er
quite valuable lessons for the empirical studies of productivity dynamics. We provide
three implications. First, large persistent productivity di¤erences cannot be taken
as evidence of large rm-specic time-invariant heterogeneity. There may not be a
positive link between the persistent productivity di¤erences and large rm hetero-
geneity and, even if the link exists, it can be quantitatively small. Second, empirical
research on the persistent productivity di¤erences must seriously take into account
the e¤ect of assignment. Our analytical and quantitative results suggest that the
mechanism of assignment inuencing the persistence and diversity of productivity is
really complex, but all e¤ects move in the same direction and the compounded ef-
fects are huge. Therefore, the cost of ignoring the assignment mechanism cannot be
negligible. Finally, if one could not suitably control the expectations on the rms
capability in the productivity dynamics, researchers might encounter di¢ culties in
nding causal reasons for persistent productivity di¤erences. In order to construct
suitable expectations, our derived productivity dynamics can be useful.
Hopefully, these suggestions can assist in advancing research on productivity dif-
ferences.
7Training cost also causes mismatches when the results of training are uncertain.
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7 Appendix
The Proof of Theorem 2: Consider a mapping, T
TV = max
ln qt
8<: (1  )E [ytjot; ot; ln qt]  w (ln qt : xt)+ R V  ot+1; ot+1 : xt+1; F d s (stjot; ot)
9=; ;
E

ytjot; 2ot; ln qt

=


r
 
1 
exp
1
1  

ot +
2ot
2
+  ln qt

;
ot+1 = lnB
 +  [(1  ht)ot + htst] +  ln qt + F  
2"
2
Suppose that the value function and the wage function are represented by equations
(19) and (18). Dene:
MPQ (ot; ot; ln qt) =
d (1  )E [ytjot; 2ot; ln qt]
d ln qt
+
Z
dV
 
ot+1; ot+1 : xt+1; F

d ln qt
d s (stjot; ot) :
Then, we can derive:
w0 (ln qt : xt) =MPQ

t
q
 
ln qt   q

+ eot; ot; ln qt

:
Hence, when a rm is endowed with ot =
t
q
 
ln qt   q

+eot, it can equate the mar-
ginal cost of ln qt, w0 (ln qt : xt) to the marginal benet of ln qt, MPQ (ot; ot; ln qt)
by choosing ln qt. It is easy to check that:
w00 (ln qt : xt) >
@MPQ (ot; ot; ln qt)
@ ln qt
jot=tq (ln qt q)+eot :
Hence, the objective function of the rm endowed with ot =
t
q
 
ln qt   q

+ eot is
strictly concave in ln qt and  (ot; ot : xt) is a unique optimal decision. Using this
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policy function, TV can be rewritten as:
TV = (1  )E [ytjot; ot; F ]  w

q
t
(ot   eot) + q : xt

+
Z
V
 
ot+1; ot+1 : xt+1; F

d s (stjot; ot)
=
(1  )E [ytjot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t
+

+ q
t
Z
V
 
ot+1; ot+1 : xt+1; F

d s (stjot; ot)
=
(1  )E [ytjot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t
+

+ q
t
1X
i=0
is=1

+ q
t+s
(1  )E [yt+1+ijot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t+1+i
=
(1  )E [ytjot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t
+
1X
j=1
ju=1

+ q
t+u 1
(1  )E [yt+jjot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t+j
=
1X
j=0
ju=1

+ q
t+u 1
(1  )E [yt+jjot; ot; F ]
1 +  q
t+j
;
where E [ytjot; ot; F ] is dened in Theorem 2. Hence, TV = V .
Finally, we show that
P1
j=0
j
u=1

+
q
t+u 1
(1 )E[yt+j jot;ot;F ]
1+
 q
t+j
is bounded. Because

+
q
t+u 1
< 1, it is enough to show that limj!1 t+j > 0, and E

ot+ijot; ot; F

and V ar

ot+ijot; ot; F

are bounded. We rst show that if u
"
is nite or F > 0,
limj!1 t+j > 0 and E

ot+ijot; ot; F

and V ar

ot+ijot; ot : F

are bounded.
For this purpose, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 9 Lemma 10 For any 0, there is some t > 0 such that:
t  q + F
1   :
Proof. Suppose that the above lemma does not apply. Then, for all t > 0, t <
q+F
1  . This means that:
covFt+1 =

+
q
t

covFt + 
2
F >
 
+
1  
1 + F
q
!
covFt + 
2
F .
Hence, there is some t such that:
2F
1 

+ 1 
1+
F
q
 < covFt  tF :
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This means that:
t >
F
1 

+ 1 
1+
F
q
 = q + F
1   :
Contradiction.
Lemma 11 Suppose u
"
is nite or F > 0:
t  q
1  :
Then:
t+1 >
q
1  :
Proof. Because u
"
is nite, it means that ot > 0 and ht > 0, and F > 0 means
that covFt > 0. Suppose that t  q1  . Then
t+1 =
s
+
q
t
2
2t + 
2ht2ot + 2

+
q
t

covFt + 2F
> t + q   q
1   + q =
q
1  :
As lemmas 10 and 11 show that if u
"
is nite or F > 0, there is a  such
that t >
q
1  and, therefore,  +
q
t
< 1 for t > : Hence, limj!1 t+j > 0,
and E

ot+ijot; ot; F

and V ar

ot+ijot; ot; F

converge to nite values. Next,
suppose that u
"
= 1 and F = 0. Then, V ar

ot+ijot; ot; F

= 0 and t+j =
t+j 1+q. This means that t+j =
1 j
1  q+
jt and limj!1 t+j =
q
1  >
0. Hence, it is enough to show that E

ot+ijot; ot; F

is bounded. We dene
Di = 
i 1
x=0

+
q
t+x

:
Note that if Di is bounded, E

ot+ijot; ot; F

is bounded. Hence, we need to prove
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that Di is bounded.
Di = 
i 1
x=0
(
+
q
1 x
1  q + 
xt
)
;
= i 1x=0
8<:1 + (  1)
241  q
q +
h
1 

+ q
t
i
t
x
359=; ;
= i 1x=0
8<:1  (1  )
h
1 

+ q
t
i
1  + q
t

1
x
  1

9=; :
Note that for both 1  + q
t
and 1 < + q
t
, the following condition is satised.
i 1x=0
8<:1  (1  )
h
1 

+ q
t
i
1  + q
t

1
x
  1

9=;  i 1x=0
8<:1  (1  )
h
1 

+ q
t
i
1  + (1  )

1
x
  1

9=;
Hence, it can be shown that:
Di  i 1x=0

1  x

1 

+
q
t

= exp
i 1X
x=0
log

1 + x

+
q
t

  1

 exp
i 1X
x=0
x

+
q
t

  1

= exp
1  i
1  

+
q
t

  1

:
This means that:
lim
i!1
Di  exp

+ q
t

  1
1   :
Hence, Di is bounded. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 3: In order to prove the existence of a unique stationary
distribution, it is enough to show that there exists a unique x1 = (eo1; 1; o1; covF1),
where x1 is the steady state value of xt. The steady state values of two variables
eo1 and o1 are directly solved as follows.
eo1 =
lnB + q   
2
"
2
1   ; (35)
2o1 =
2"
1  2 (1  h1)
; (36)
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where:
h1 = 

u
"

=
 
 
1  2 u
"
2
+ 1

+
s 
1  2 u
"
2
+ 1
2
+ 42

u
"
2
22

u
"
2 :
(37)
Moreover, using (37), we can show that 0

u
"

< 0, limu
"
!0 

u
"

= 1 and
limu
"
!1 

u
"

= 0. Suppose that 11 =  +
q
1 > 1. Then, covF1 diverges
and there is no stationary distribution. Hence, 11 = +
q
1 must be less than one
in order to guarantee the existence. Suppose that 11 =  +
q
1 < 1. Then, the
steady state value of covF1 is also directly solved:
covF1 =
2F
1  11 : (38)
Moreover, using equations (36) and (38), 21 must satisfy the following:
21 = 
2
11
2
1 + 
2h12o1 + 211covF1 + 
2
F ;
=
1
1  211

2h12"
1  2 (1  h1)
+
2112F
1  11 + 
2
F

:
Rearranging this equation, we can derive:

q
"
2
=
264 1
1 

+ q
1
2 2h11  2 (1  h1) + 1h1  + q
1
i2 F"
2375 q
1
2
:
DeneD

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

=

q
1
2
1 

+
q
1
2 2(u" )
1 2(1 (u" ))
+

q
1
2
h
1 

+
q
1
i2

F
"
2
 

q
"
2
.
We can show that D1

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

> 0, lim q
1!0
D

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

< 0 and
lim q
1!
1 
F
q
+
<1 D

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

> 0. Hence, there exists q
1 = 

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

in

0; 1 F
q
+

and, therefore, 11 = +
q
1 < 1. Moreover, asD2

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

<
0,D3

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

< 0 andD4

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

> 0, 1

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

> 0, 2

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

>
0 and3

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

< 0: Finally, using the results that limu
"
;!1D

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

=
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
q
1
2
h
1 

+
q
1
i2

F
"
2
 

q
"
2
and lim q
"
!0D

q
1 ;
u
"
; q
"
; F
"

= q
1 , we can show
that limq
"
!0

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

= 0, and limu
"
;!1

q
"
; u
"
; F
"

= 1 F
q
+
. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 4: Because:
deot+1
deot
=  2 (0; 1) ; d
2
ot+1
d2ot
= 2 (1  ht)2 2 (0; 1) ;
eo1 and o1 are globally stable. Dene St =
t
q
, SF = Fq , Sot =
ot
q
, S" = "q ,
and Ct =
covFt
(q)
2 . Then:
St+1 =
s
(St + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+
1
St

Ct + S2F ;
Ct+1 = 
2
F +

+
1
t

Ct:
Wewill prove that if q
"
F
"
 
2(1 )(u" )
2[1 2(1 (u" ))]
, or equivalently, if SF  
2(1 )(u" )S
2
"
2[1 2(1 (u" ))]
,
S1 and C1 are globally stable.
Lemma 12 Suppose that for all S; C and t: CS2
+ + 1S < 1
Then, a mapping of T such that:
T (S; C; t) =
264
r
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
S2F +

+ 1
S

C
375
is a contraction mapping.
Proof. Dene f () and g () :
f (S; C; t) =
s
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+
1
S

C + S2F
g (S; C) = 
2
F +

+
1
S

C
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Take any (S; C) and
 
S 0; C
0. Then, the mean value theorem implies that there
exists
 
S; C
, where S 2  S; S 0 and C 2 (C;C 0) such that:
f (S; C; t)  f
 
S 0; C
0; t

=
 
 S + 1

  C2
f
 
S; C; t
  S   S 0+ + 1Sf   S; C; t (C   C 0) ;
g (S; C
)  g  S 0; C 0 =   CS2  S   S 0+

+
1
S

(C   C 0) :
Because we can show that:
max
f (S; C; t)  f  S 0; C 0; t ; g (S; C)  g  S 0; C 0	
 max
8><>:
( S+1)  CS2
++ 1S 
f( S; C;t)
; CS2 + + 1S
9>=>;maxS   S 0 ; jC   C 0j	
if, for all S; C and t;:
max
8>><>>:
(S + 1)  C2 + + 1Sr
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
;
 CS2
+ + 1S
9>>=>>; < 1;
the mapping of T is a contraction. Next, we need to show that:(S + 1)  CS2 + + 1Sr
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
<
 CS2
+ + 1S
Suppose that (S + 1)  CS2 .
(S + 1)  CS2 +

+ 1
S

r
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
=
S

+ 1
S
2
  C
S2r
+ 1
S
2
S2 + 
2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
 + 1
S

 CS2
+ + 1S
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Suppose that (S + 1) < CS2 .
C
S2
  (S + 1)+

+ 1
S

r
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
<
C
S2
+

+ 1
S

r
(S + 1)
2 + 2htS2ot + 2

+ 1
S

C + S2F
<
C
S2
+

+
1
S

:
Hence, if for all S; C and t
CS2 + + 1S < 1, the mapping T is a contraction.
Lemma 13 Suppose that S > 1+SF1  . CS2
+ + 1S
 < 1
Proof. Suppose that S > 1+SF1  . Because SFS  jCj,
1 > +
1
S
+
SF
S
 + 1
S
+
 CS2
 :
Lemma 14 Suppose that:
SF 
2 (1  ) 

u
"

S2"
2
h
1  2

1  

u
"
i :
There exists a  such that, for all t >  if:
St  1 + SF
1   ;
then:
St+1 >
1 + SF
1   :
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Proof. Because Ct+1 = S2F +

+ 1
St

Ct > S
2
F + Ct and htS
2
ot converges to
(u" )S
2
"
1 2(1 (u" ))
, there exists a  such that, for all t >  :
St+1 >
vuuut(St + 1)2 + 2

u
"

S2"
1  2

1  

u
"
 + 2 S2F
1   + S
2
F :
Suppose that St  1+SF1  . Then, for all t >  :
St+1 >
vuuut1 + SF
1   + 1
2
+
2

u
"

S2"
1  2

1  

u
"
 + 2 S2F
1   + S
2
F :
Rearranging the equation, we can obtain:
St+1 >
vuuut1 + SF
1  
2
+
2

u
"

S2"
1  2

1  

u
"
   2SF
(1  ) :
Because SF  
2(1 )(u" )S
2
"
2[1 2(1 (u" ))]
, St+1 > 1+SF1  .
Because Skt and, therefore, ht are globally stable, using lemma 10, lemma 12,
lemma 13 and lemma 14, the desired result follows. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 6:First, we derive a closed form solution of D lnAFt j
and later we discuss how we can derive a closed form solution of V ar [F ] and
V ar

D lnAFt

. Because AFt =M
AAFt 1 + vt 1,
E
h
AFt
 
AFt j
0i
=
 
MA
j 1
E
h
AFt (j 1)
 
AFt j
0i
= TA
j 1T 1A E
h
AFt+1
 
AFt
0i
;
where:
TA
jT 1A =
1
h1 +
q
1
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
24 h1j11 + q1j21 q1  j11   j21
h1
 
j11   j21
 q
1
j
11 + h1
j
21
35
+  q
1h1
 
j11   j21
24 1  1
1  1
35
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
:
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Note that E
h
AFt+1
 
AFt
0i
= MAE

AFt
 
AFt
0
+ E
 
vtA
F
t

. As we can show
that E

AFt
 
AFt
0
= V ar

E

lnAFt jot
 24 1 1
1 1
35+ V ar lnAFt jot
24 1 0
0 0
35 and
E
h
vt
 
AFt
0i
=
24  2u 0
0 0
35, it is shown that:
E
h
AFt+1
 
AFt
0i
= 11V ar

E

D lnAFt jot
 24 1 1
1 1
35+h11 +  q
1

V ar

D lnAFt jot
 24 1 0
1 0
35 ,
where we use a relationship 
2
u
V ar[D lnAFt jot]
= 1   h1 for this derivation. The rela-
tionship, 
2
u
V ar[D lnAFt jot]
= 1  h1, is easily proved from V ar

D lnAFt jot

= 
2
o1
h1 , the
derivation of which is discussed later. Now, we can derive the following:
E
h
AFt
 
AFt j
0i
= j 111
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
11V ar

E

D lnAFt jot
 24 1 1
1 1
35
+h1

1 +  q
1

V ar

D lnAFt jot
 24 1 0
1 0
35
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
:
Hence, we can show that:
E[D lnAF j]j = 
j
11;
D lnAF j =
8><>:
11
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
+h1

1 +  q
1

1  V ar[E[D lnA
F
t jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]

9>=>;j 111 :
This shows that we need to know a closed form solution of
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
for
D lnAF j. Hence, the remaining tasks are the derivations of V ar

E

D lnAFt jot

,
V ar

D lnAFt

and V ar [F A]. AsD lnA
F
t =
h
(ln kot   eo1)  F1 11
i
+  q
1
h
(ot   eo1)  F1 11
i
+
ut , we can show that V ar

E

D lnAFt jot

=

1 +  q
1
2
2h12o1
1 211 and V ar

D lnAFt jot

=
E

V ar

D lnAFt jot

= 
2
o1
h1 . Using equation (36), V ar

E

D lnAFt jot

=

1+
 q
1
2
2h12"
(1 211)[1 2(1 h1)]
andE

V ar

D lnAFt jot

= 
2
"
h1[1 2(1 h1)] . Because V ar

D lnAFt

= V ar

E

D lnAFt jot

+
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E

V ar

D lnAFt jot

,
V ar[E[D lnAFt jot]]
V ar[D lnAFt ]
=

1+
 q
1
2
2h21
1 211
1+
 q
1
2
2h21
1 211
+1
. Because V ar

D lnAFt

=
V ar

E

D lnAFt jot

+ E

V ar

D lnAFt jot

, it is derived that V ar

D lnAFt

="
1+
 q
1
2
2h21
1 21 + 1
#
(")
2
h1[1 2(1 h1)] . Finally, because F
 =
1+
 q
1
1 11 F , V ar [F
] =

1+
 q
1
2
(1 11)2 
2
F and the desired results are derived . Q.E.D.
Data Construction: The construction of the value added and capital stock follows
from Matsuura and Kiyota (2004).
 yft: The value added is dened by sales + an increase or decrease in inventory -
operating expense + labor expense + depreciation. The variable yft is estimated
by the value added divided by the number of workers.
 kft: According to Matsuura and Kiyota (2004), there are many missing values.
They suggested the following method.
Kft = Kft 1 +

~Kft   ~Kft 1

=PIt; if ~Kft > ~Kft 1
= Kft 1 +

~Kft   ~Kft 1

; if ~Kft  ~Kft 1;
where Kft is teal physical capital stock,; ~Kft is the book value of tangible xed
assets at year t and PIt is an investment goods deator. The equation assumes
that if ~Kft > ~Kft 1, we have net investment, but if ~Kft  ~Kft 1, there is no
net investment.
 rt: The user cost of capital, rt, is estimated by the following equation:
rt = PIt  (it + dep  gpit) ;
where it is the 10-year-bond yield, which is taken from the Bank of Japan, dep
is the depreciation rate of capital and gpit =
PIt PIt 1
PIt 1
. The depreciation rate
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is estimated by the sample average of Depft
Kft
, where Depft is the depreciation of
the fth rm in year t.
Summary Statistics: (The number of rms is 6265 for all years)
yft (nominal) kft # of workers wft (nominal)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1994 7.297 11.85 9.829 15.40 621.4 2398 4.640 1.683
1995 7.664 5.249 9.978 17.06 611.9 2316 5.024 1.676
1996 7.978 6.791 10.24 17.04 610.0 2311 5.179 1.713
1997 7.824 8.389 10.54 17.01 613.0 2367 5.103 1.659
1998 7.483 4.917 10.92 17.48 608.3 2356 5.082 1.643
1999 7.660 5.978 11.18 18.59 604.8 2391 5.041 1.642
2000 8.144 7.624 11.41 17.25 605.4 2509 5.244 1.876
2001 7.775 7.150 11.80 17.87 588.2 2317 5.229 1.913
2002 7.860 7.185 11.88 17.81 586.2 2384 5.154 1.914
2003 8.036 11.18 11.83 16.50 590.6 2402 5.101 2.090
2004 8.337 15.76 11.84 15.91 604.8 2724 5.085 2.011
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8 Appendix 2: Robustness
8.1 Robustness Checks using BSJBSA
Calibrated Parameters using BSJBSA
 q
1 h1 
2
F 
2
"
 q
1
min b5 0.185 0.528 1 0.002 0.044 1.547
max b5 0.713 0.001 0.113 0.0004 0.003 4.846
The Decomposition of Persistence and Variance using BSJBSA
11 z
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
V ar [D lnAt] V ar (F

A) V ar

D lnAFt

Benchmark 0.713 0.547 0.729 0.234 0.171 0.064
min b5
q
"
= 0 0.185 0.185 0.067 0.049 0.003 0.045
 = 0 0.185 0.418 0.282 0.075 0.021 0.054
 = 0 0.713 0.219 0.360 0.073 0.026 0.047
F
"
= 0 0.946 0.866 0 0.191 0 0.191
u
"
= 0 0.713 0.547 0.729 0.234 0.171 0.064
max b5
q
"
= 0 0.713 0.089 0.101 0.049 0.005 0.044
 = 0 0.713 0.547 0.727 0.233 0.170 0.064
 = 0 0.713 0.089 0.101 0.049 0.005 0.044
F
"
= 0 0.715 0.846 0 0.193 0 0.193
u
"
= 0 0.713 0.808 0.633 0.270 0.171 0.099
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8.2 Robustness Checks using COMPUSTAT
Regression Results using COMPUSTAT
D lnAt 1 E

D lnAt 1jot 1

# of Obs.
D lnAt 0.531 (0.205) 0.182 (0.021) 74020
D lnAt 1   E

D lnAt 1jot 1

# of Obs.
D lnAt   E [D lnAtjot] 0.044 (0.049) 74020
WC-Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. denotes signicance at the
one percent level.
Calibrated Parameters using COMPUSTAT
 q
1 h1 
2
F 
2
"
 q
1
Benchmark b5 0.220 0.493 0.798 0.002 0.096 2.025
min b5 0.193 0.520 1 0.003 0.121 1.757
max b5 0.712 0.001 0.121 0.001 0.008 5.146
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The Decomposition of Persistence and Variance using COMPUSTAT
11 z
V ar[F A]
V ar[D lnAt]
V ar [D lnAt] V ar (F

A) V ar

D lnAFt

Benchmark 0.713 0.597 0.549 0.423 0.232 0.191
Benchmark b5
q
"
= 0 0.220 0.177 0.027 0.128 0.003 0.125
 = 0 0.220 0.460 0.167 0.188 0.031 0.157
 = 0 0.713 0.207 0.165 0.154 0.025 0.129
F
"
= 0 0.889 0.814 0 0.373 0 0.373
u
"
= 0 0.708 0.682 0.551 0.400 0.220 0.179
min b5
q
"
= 0 0.193 0.193 0.030 0.130 0.004 0.126
 = 0 0.193 0.454 0.158 0.186 0.029 0.157
 = 0 0.713 0.230 0.190 0.161 0.031 0.130
F
"
= 0 0.892 0.812 0 0.350 0 0.350
u
"
= 0 0.713 0.597 0.549 0.423 0.232 0.191
max b5
q
"
= 0 0.712 0.096 0.047 0.129 0.006 0.123
 = 0 0.712 0.597 0.548 0.421 0.231 0.190
 = 0 0.713 0.096 0.048 0.129 0.006 0.123
F
"
= 0 0.714 0.810 0 0.374 0 0.374
u
"
= 0 0.713 0.805 0.416 0.558 0.232 0.326
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